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PROSECUTION UNDER STATE LAW AND MUNIC-
IPAL ORDINANCE AS DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CHARLES M. KNEIER*
Prosecution under both state and federal law for the same act
does not constitute double jeopardy.' A person so prosecuted is
not placed in double jeopardy since he is being tried in two juris-
dictions for offenses against different sovereignties. A distinction
is thus drawn between the offense against the law and the act con-
stituting the offense.2
Following this principle, may a person be prosecuted under both
municipal ordinance and state law for the same act? Does the
act in this case constitute two offenses? Or is the city in such case
acting as an agent of the state, and would prosecution for the vio-
lation of both the ordinance and the state law constitute double
jeopardy, being prosecution twice by the state? This question has
arisen in several recent cases in connection with the prohibition laws,
where an act was in violation of both the state law and the munic-
ipal ordinance.3
The'courts are not in agreement as to the answer to these questions.
While the weight of authority is that prosecution by both the state
and the municipality does not constitute double jeopardy there is a
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois.
'Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410 (U. S. 1847); United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560
(U. S. 185o); Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13 (U. S, 1852); United States v. Lanza,
26o U. S. 377, 43 Sup. Ct. 141 (1922); Martin v. United States, 271 Fed. 685
(C. C. A. 8th, 1921); United States v. Ratagczak, 275 Fed. 558 (N. D. Ohio,
r921); Singleton v. United States, 287 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); Gilbert v.
State, I9 Ala. App. 104, 95 So. 502 (1923); Little v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 320,
247 S. W. 2 (1923); Rambo v. State, 38 Okla. Cr. 192, 259 Pac. 602 (1927); State
v. Moseley, 122 S. C. 62, 114 S. E. 866 (1922); State v. Jewett, 120 Wash. 36, 207
Pac. 3 (1922).
rUnited States v. McCam*', i F. (2d) 985 (E. D. Pa. 1924).
3Where municipal courts and state courts are given concurrent jurisdiction to
try offenses against state law, trial in either jurisdiction bars prosecution in the
other. This would clearly be putting a person in double jeopardy for the same
offense. "When the law confers upon municipal officers jurisdiction to try
offenses against the state, it makes such officers its officers in the trial of such
cases, and it is not analogous to the trial for a mere violation of a city ordinance."
Brooks v. State, 155 Ala. 78, 82, 46 So. 491, 492 (I9o8); Dowling v. City of Troy,
i Ala. App. 5o8, 56 So. 116 (1911); Ex parle Ratley, 188 Ala. 107, 66 So. 147
(1914); Jackson v. State, 136 Ala. 96, 33 So. 888 (19o3); Gustin v. State, io Ala.
App. 171, 65 So. 302 (1914); cf. Thon v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. 887 (1878);
Morganstern v. Commonwealth, 94 Va. 787, 26 S. E. 4o2 (1896); Bryan v. Com-
monwealth, 126 Va. 749, 1O S. E. 316 (1919).
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minority view holding that the act constitutes a single offense. It is
the purpose of this paper to point out and consider the reasoning
of the courts in support of these two views.
The constitutions of most states prohibit the placing of a person in
double jeopardy for the same offense.4 These state constitutional
provisions against double jeopardy are, however, "merely declara-
atory of the ancient principle of the common law."'  The Supreme
Court of Missouri has stated that "it goes without saying that the
tomnon law as to double jeopardy is in effect in this State, unless
the same has been changed by the Constitution or statutory en-
actment."16 Thus we may say that double jeopardy is prohibited in
all states by constitutional provision, statutory enactment, or by the
principles of the common law.
In the states which hold that a city may be constitutionally
authorized to punish an act, even though it is also an offense under
state law, the view taken is that the test of double jeopardy "is not
whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act,
but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offence."
The act is held to constitute two distinct offenses against separate
jurisdictions and the situation is considered to be analogous to those
cases where the same act is punishable under a congressional statute
4CONST. OF ALA., art. i, § 9; CONST. OF ARIZ., art. 2, § io; CONST. OF CAL., art. I,
§ 13; CONST. OF COLO., art. 2, § 18; CONST. OF DEL., art I, § 8; CoNsT. OF FLA.,
Decl. of Rights, § 12; CONST. OF GA., art. i, § I (8); CONST. OF IDAHO, art. I, § 13;
CONST. OF ILL., art. 2, § 10; CONST. OF IND., art. I, § 14; CONST. OF KAS., Bill of
Rights, § io; CONST. OF Ky., § 13; CONST. OF LA., Bill of Rights, § 9; CONST. OF
ME., art. x, § 8; CONST. OF MIcH., art. 2, § 14; CONST. OF MINN., art i, § 7; CONST.
OF Miss., art. 3, § 22; CONST. OF Mo., art. 2, § 23; CONST. OF MONT., art. 3, § I8;
CONST. OF NEi., art. I, § 12; CONST. OF NEv., art. i, § 8; CONST. OF N. H., art.
I6; CoNST. OF N. J., art. I, § 1O; CONST. OF N. M., art. 2, § 15; CONST. OF N. Y.,
art. i, § 6; CONST. OF N. D., art. 1, § 13; CONST. OF OHIO, art. I, § 1O; CONST. OF
OKLA., art. 2, § 21; CONST. OF ORE., art. I, § 12; CONST. OF PA., art. I, § Io;
CONST. OF R. I., art. 1, § 7; CONST. OF S. C., art. I, § 17; CONST. OF S. D., art.
6, § 9; CONST. OF TENN., art. I, § 10; CONST. OF TEXAS, art I, § 14; CONST. OF
UTAH, art. I, § 12; CONST. OF VA., art. I, § 8; CONST. OF WASH., art. I, § 9; CONST.
OF W. VA., art. 3, § 5; CONST. OF Wis., art. i, § 8; CONST. OF Wyo., art. I, § II.
SHarris v. State, 17 Okla. Cr. 69, 84, 175 Pac. 627, 631 (i918).6State v. Linton, 283 Mo. i, 8, 222 S. W. 847, 849 (1920).
7State v. Stewart, xi Ore. 52, 4 Pac. 128 (1883); Mayhew v. City of Eugene, 56
Ore. 102, 104 Pac. 727 (i909); State v. O'Donnell, 77 Ore. in6, i49 Pac. 536
(x915); Harlew v. Claw, iio Ore. 257, 223 Pac. 54I (1924); Miller v. Hansen,
126 Ore. 297, 269 Par. 864 (1928); Claypool v. McCauley, 131 Ore.371, 283 Pac.
751 (1929); Thiesen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 44o, x6 So. 321 (1894); Greenwood v.
State, 65 Tenn. 567 (1873); State v. Sanders, 68 S. C. 192, 47 S. E. 55 (904).
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and also under a state law." The municipal ordinance is held to be
for the preservation of the good government, order and security
of the city, and the state law for the maintenance of the public
peace and dignity of the state.9
The Supreme Court of Alabama has held that the municipal
ordinance is not to punish for an offense against the criminal justice
of the state but to "provide a mere police regulation for the enforce-
ment of good order aid quiet within the limits of the corporation."'0
The court took the view that the offenses against the corporation
and the state are "distinguishable, and wholly disconnected, and
the prosecution at the suit of each proceeds upon a different hy-
pothesis."'10
A similar view has been taken by the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land. It has held that the municipal ordinance is an exercise of the
police power and is not the same as the general judicial power of
the state to punish offenses made such by general law. The ordi-
nances are "but a part of the police power, as contradistinguished
from the regular judiciary powers of the State."" The Supreme
Court of Minnesota has also taken the view that though the munic-
ipal ordinances are given the force of law by the charter, yet they
relate solely to the purposes of the municipal government, and
"prosecutions for their violation have no reference, as a general rule,
to the administration of criminal justice by the state.'12
sHughes v. People, 8 Colo. 536, 9 Pac. 5o (1885); McInerney v. City of Denver,
17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516 (1892); Gillooley v. Vaughn, 92 Fla. 943, iio So. 653
(1926); Sutton v. City of Washington, 4 Ga. App. 30, 6o S. E. 8II (i9O8); State v.
Preston, 4 Idaho 215, 38 Pac. 694 (1894); In re Henry, 15 Idaho 755, 99 Pac.
1054 (19o9); State v. Cole, 118 Wash. 511, 203 Pac. 942 (1922).
9Ex parte Simmons, 4 Okla. Cr. 662, 112 Pac. 951 (I9Ii); Cumpton v. City of
Muskogee, 23 Okla. Cr. 412, 225 Pac. 562 (1923); In re Monroe, 13 Okla. Cr. 62,
262 Pac. 233 (1917).
'
0Mayor etc., of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400, 403 (1848).
0aIbid. Also see: Black v. State, 144 Ala. 92, 4 So. 6II (19o6); Leigeber v.
State, 17 Ala. App. 551, 86 So. 126 (1920); Williams v. State, 18 Ala. App. 218, 9o
So. 36 (1921); Courson v. State, 18 Ala. App. 538, 93 So. 223 (1922); Leach v.
State, 2o Ala. App. I5, 100 So. 3o6 (1924); Morgan v. State, 2o Ala. App. 581,
104 So. 341 (1925); Marchman v. State, 21 Ala. App. 421, 209 So. 121 (1926).
"Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331, 336 (1861); Norwood v. Wiseman, 141 Md.
696, I29 Atl. 688 (1922).
EState v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 451, 13 N. W. 913, 914 (1882); State v. Oleson,
26 Minn. 507, 5 N. W. 959 (288o); State v. Bell, 26 Minn. 388, 5 N. W. 970 (288o);
State v. Cavett, 172 Minn. 16, 214 N. W. 479 (1927). Also see: Bueno v. State,
4o Fla. 16o, 23 So. 862 (1898); Robbins v. People, 95 III. 175 (288o); Johnson v.
State, 59 Miss. 543 (1882); State v. Lytle, r38 N. C. 738, 51 S. E. 66 (1905); Koch
v. State, 53 Ohio St. 433, 41 N. E. 689 (1895).
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In upholding prosecution under both state law and municipal
ordinance for the same act, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has
taken the view that when the municipality punished it was for "an
offence against the right of the corporation, for which fine and im-
prisonment may be imposed, and in thus punishing, it is the par-
ticular offence against the corporation that is punished, and not the
act of assault and battery denounced throughout the State."' 3
The court held that the provision forbidding double jeopardy "was
not intended to apply to trial under corporate proceedings for wrongs
done and the violation of ordinances adopted with the view of main-
taining peace and security under corporate authority, so far as to
operate a bar to prosecution on the part of the state. ' a The purpose
of the ordinance was "not to punish for an offense against the criminal
justice of the country, but to maintain due regulation as an incident
of the existence of the corporate organization."Ilb
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has stated that since many acts
are often more injurious and the temptation to do them much greater
in cities than in the state generally, "[wihen done in such localities
they are not only wrongs to the public at large, but are additional
wrongs to the corporations. '1 4 The court held that such acts could
and should be made penal by the incorporated cities and villages.
although they were already made so by state law. In considering the
question of double jeopardy the court said: "When made penal
by the State and the city or town, each act becomes a separate
offense against the State and the municipality. In that event the
penalty imposed by the city or town is superadded to that fixed
by the general law, on account of the additional wrong done-for the
offense against the municipality. In such case the wrong doer would
not be twice punished for the same offense."1 4a
A different line of reasoning has been used in some states to' sustain
the right of prosecution under both state law and municipal ordi-
nance. In a case before the Supreme Court of Indiana in i861 where
the question of double jeopardy was presented, the act of the state
legislature incorporating the City of Richmond provided for the re-
covery of a penalty for the violation of any ordinance, by-law, or
police regulation, in an action of debt. A subsequent act of the legis-
lature prohibited the sale of liquor in the city and authorized the
13State v. Clifford, 45 La. Ann. 980, 982, 13 So. 281 (1893).
13afl~j4
1
uVan Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 368, 373, 14 S. W. 38, 39 (I8go).
uarjW- 374, 14 S. W. at 39.
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council to carry out the provisions of the act and to provide for
the recovery of penalties "in the manner provided in the act of in-
corporation." The court held that the recovery of the penalty was
thus a civil suit and not a criminal prosecution; since the city was
authorized to proceed for the penalty "in the manner authorized by
the act of incorporation," it was an "action of debt" by the city
against the offender.1 5
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in considering the question of
double jeopardy has also taken the view that the violation of the
municipal ordinance is not a crime. As stated by the court, "The fact
that the ordinance provides that the offense 'shall be punished by a
fine' does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the offense is
criminal or quasi criminal in its nature. When used in a city ordi-
nance, the term 'punished by fine' 'implies a mere forfeiture or
penalty collectible by civil action in the name of the city, in which
case the city has the right of appeal.' "16 The court went on to point
out that subjecting one to a penalty under an ordinance, and to
criminal prosecution are "distinct in their legal character, both as
to the nature and quality of the offenses and the jurisdiction offended
against."16a
While the Supreme Court of Missouri earlier took the view that
prosecution under both state law and municipal ordinance would
constitute double jeopardy, in later cases it was stated that other
rulings had thrown a different light on the subject of the nature of a
city ordinance and caused doubt to arise as to the correctness of its
former view. The court now held that prosecution under both city
ordinance and state law did not constitute double jeopardy since it
15Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281, 284 (1855). Also see: Thomas v. City of Indian-
apolis, 195 Ind. 44o, 145 N. E. 550 (1924).
"City of Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585, 589, 213 N. W. 335, 337 (1927).
16abid. 590, 213 N. W. at 337. Also see: People v. Smith, 146 Mich. 193, io9 N.
W. 411 (i9O6); People v. Jackson, 8 Mich. I1O (i86o). The Supreme Court of
Illinois has stated that "[a] suit by a city or village to recover a penalty for the
violation of an ordinance is a civil suit, and the rules applicable to criminal pro-
cedure have no application thereto." City of Chicago v. Williams, 254 Ill. 36o,
363, 98 N. E. 666, 667 (1912). Also see: City of Chicago v. Knobel, 232 Ill. 112,
83 N. E. 459 (19o8). The Supreme Court of Michigan has held, however, that
"[a]n ordinance, validly enacted, prohibiting certain acts under fines, penalties, or
imprisonment, is, within the jurisdiction of the municipality enacting it, as
much entitled to respectful obedience, and is as much the law of the land for that
locality, as a law enacted by the Legislature; and a person violating it commits an
offense, and in one sense a crime, for which he may be sentenced, if under the
authority of a statute the ordinance so provides, to imprisonment at hard labor."
People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 6II, 620, 42 N. W. 1124, 1127 (1889).
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did not regard "the violation of the ordinance under consideration as
a crime, since 'a crime... is an act committed in violation of a public
law.' "'7 The rosecution for violation of the city ordinance was "but
a civil suit. "7'
In the cases where it has been held that prosecution for the same
act under state law and municipal ordinance would constitute double
jeopardy, the courts point out that the right of the municipality to
define and punish crimes arises from the delegation of power to it by
its superior sovereign, the state. In the prosecution of such crimes
under this delegated authority the municipality is thus acting as an
agent of the state and to permit "double prosecution would be to
allow the state, once directly and once through an agency, to prose-
cute for the same act." 18
This was the earlier view taken by the Supreme Court of Missouri.
It held that if a municipality took cognizance of an act made an
offense by its ordinances and punished it, the person thus punished
could not be subjected to punishment by the state for the same act.
The court stated that in view of the prohibition on double jeopardy,
" [t]o hold that a party can be prosecuted for an act under the state
law after he has been punished for the same act by the municipal
corporation within whose limits the act was done, would be to over-
throw the power of the general assembly to create corporations to aid
in the affairs of the state. For a power in the state to punish, after a
punishment has been inflicted by the corporate authorities, could
only find a support in the assumption that all the proceedings on the
part of the corporation were null and void."' 19 As has been pointed
out above, however, the court later abandoned this view. The court
now held that prosecution for violation of the municipal ordinance
was "but a civil suit.
20
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has also taken the
view that so far as a general statute of the state covers the same
ground as a city ordinance, both cannot be enforced in respect to the
same act so as to subject a party to a double penalty. In considering
this question the court has said: "It is a case of two jurisdictions
dealing with the same subject matter. Both however cannot be en-
forced in respect to the same act so as to subject a party to a double
l7city of Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588, 589 (1878).
-ialbid. 59o; State v. Muir, 164 Mo. 61o, 65 S. W. 285 (igoi).
18See dissenting opinion in State v. Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 164, 171, 242 Pac.
363, 364, 366 (1926).
"9State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330, 332 (186o); State v. Simonds, 3 Mo. 414 (1834);
State v. Thornton, 37 Mo. 36o (1866).20Supra note 17, at 590.
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penalty. In such cases the superior jurisdiction would ordinarily
prevail to the exclusion of the inferior."2
The Supreme Court of Michigan has taken a similar view relative
to double prosecution. It has held that where a municipal ordinance
and state law are merely auxiliary or cumulative and cover the same
offense, "prosecutions may be instituted under either law, and the
court that first acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear, try, and determine the case; and a
conviction for an offense which is the same in both laws will be a bar
to a prosecution for the same offense under the other law."2
The minority view seems worthy of more consideration than it
has thus far received. When seeking to maintain order and suppress
crime it is the holding of the courts that the city is acting as an agent
of the state. In the enforcement of law the state must either delegate
the power of punishment or retain it. If it delegates the power
to the city, the ordinance becomes "a law within its sphere of oper-
ation."'
It has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that
there may not be prosecution under a federal statute after a defendant
has been prosecuted in a territorial court of the Philippines for the
same act. The court pointed out that while punishment under state
law and federal law does not constitute double jeopardy, a different
situation exists in the relationship of the Philippines and the United
States. In the former case the act constituted two offenses, one
against the United States and the other against a state; but the same
act could not be considered to constitute two offenses "where the two
tribunals that tried the accused exert all their powers under and by
authority of the same government.... -14
The position of the city in the governmental system of the state is
such that a similar view might well be taken relative to prosecution
by both as double jeopardy. When engaged in the enforcement of
law the city may be considered an agent of the state. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina has pointed out that: "The inhabitants of a
city have no inherent right to direct its affairs. All their rights are
conferred upon them by the law making power of the State... In
short, the municipality is not in any legal sense the agent of its in-
habitants, either singly or collectively, but is a legal institution in the
21State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215, 217 (1869); Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128
(1854); State v. Flint, 63 Conn. 248, 28 Atl. 28 (1893).
22People v. Hanrahan, supra note i6a, at 628,42 N. W. at 1130.
nMartin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164, 169, 126 N. E. 814, 815 (1920).
24Grafton v. U. S., 2o6 U. S. 333, 355, 27 Sup. Ct. 749, 755 (I9O7). Also see:
U. S. v. John B. Colley, 3 Philippine 58 (19o3).
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nature of a governmental agency, deriving its powers from the
State." 5
The Supreme Court of the United States has also pointed out that
municipal corporations are "created by the authority of the legis-
lature, and they derive all their powers from the source of their
creation, except where the Constitution of the State otherwise
provides. They have no inherent jurisdiction to make laws or to
adopt governmental regulations, nor can they exercise any other
powers in that regard than such as are expressly or impliedly de-
rived from their charters or other statutes of the State... IT]he
powers of the organization may be modified or taken away at the mere
will of the legislature, according to its own views of public con-
venience, and without any necessity for the consent of those com-
posing the body politic." 26
The doctrine of an inherent right of local self government which
was followed for a time in a few states is being gradually abandoned. 27
And even in the states having constitutional home rule, law en-
forcement has not been considered to be a matter of municipal
concern but rather a matter of general interest and subject to state
control.28 Thus when engaged in the maintenance of law and order,
either by municipal ordinance or by the enforcement of state law,
the municipality is properly considered an agent of the state. Prose-
cution by both city and state would, according to this view, be
double prosecution for the same act,-once by the state directly and
once by its agent, the municipality.
From the point of view of policy it seems to be of doubtful justice to
providefor prosecution by both state and municipality for the same act.
Regardless of the legal theory, the practical effect is to punish twice
nAncrum v. Camden Water, Light and Ice Co., 82 S. C. 284, 294,64 S. E. 151,
154 (1909).
26Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 524 (188o); Meriwether v.
Garrett, 102 U. S. 501, 511 (188o); Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S.
307 (1875). Also see: Frederick v. Groshon, 30 Md. 436, 444 (1869).
27On this principle see: McBain, Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self
Government (1916) COL. L. REv. 190, 299; State v. Morris, 199 Ind. 78, 155 N. E.
198 (1927); cf. Booth v. McGuiness, 78 N. J. L. 346, 75 Atl. 455 (1910); State v.
Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274 (x888); State v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 N. E.
19 (1902); State v. Barker, 116 Iowa 96, 89 N. W. 204 (1902); Lexington v.
Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 68 S. W. 477 (1902); People v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 44
(1871).
28See for example: Ex parte Sparks, 120 Cal. 395, 52 Pac. 715 (1898); Miner v.
Justices' Court, 121 Cal. 264, 53 Pac. 795 (2898); State ex rel. Goodnow v. Police
Commissioners of Kansas City, 184 Mo. iog, 88 S. W. 27 (29o4); State ex rel.
McNamee v. Stobie, 194 Mo. 14, 92 S. W. 191 (29o5); McBAIN, THE LAW AND
THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOmE RuLE (1916) pp. 133, 142, 255, 371, 467, 654.
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for the same act. The Supreme Court of Colorado, though holding
that such double prosecution does not constitute double jeopardy has
stated that "[t]hough, if it be not so provided by statute, every fair-
minded judge will, when pronouncing judgment in the second prose-
cution or proceeding, consider a penalty already suffered."2 9 This
raises the 4uestion as to whether provision should not be made by
statute to meet this situation.
Some states have by statute or constitution prohibited prosecution
for the same act under both state law and municipal ordinance.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky earlier took the view that there
could be prosecution under both.30 The constitution of the state was
then amended to provide that: "No municipal ordinance shall fix a
penalty for a violation thereof at less than that imposed by statute
for the same offense. A conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to prosecution for the same offense." 31 This pro-
hibition has been held not to apply to cases where the state acts
under the common law. A conviction under a municipal ordinance
of maintaining a nuisance by operating a pool room has been held not
to bar a prosecution by the state for the same act, constituting a
nuisance at common law, no penalty being prescribed therefor by
statute. 2 But if the offense is statutory, there may not be prose-
cution for the same act by both city and state.-
In Alabama there was formerly a statute providing that prose-
cution for violation of a municipal ordinance would "bar a prosecution
for the same, or substantially the same, offense in the state courts."
The Court of Appeals of the state held that the clear intent of this
provision was to prohibit a double punishment for the same act or
conduct. 4 This law prohibiting such double prosecution was, how-
ever, repealed in 1915.3"
Texas has also provided that no person shall be punished twice for
the same act or omission, even though it be an offense against both the
penal laws of the state and the ordinances of the city. The law pro-
vides, however, that no ordinance of a city shall be valid which
22McInerney v. City of Denver, supra note 8, at 307, 29 Pac. at 518.
30Kemper v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 219, 3 S. W. 159 (1887).
3 1CONST. OF KY., § 168.
32Lucas v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 818, 82 S. W. 44o (1904). Also see: City
of Owensboro v. Simms, 99 Ky. 49, 34 S. W. lO85 (1896); Respass v. Common-
wealth, 107 Ky. 139, 53 S. W. 24 (1899); Pineville v. Davis, 220 Ky. 95, 294 S. W.
766 (1927).
33White v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 1312, 92 S. W. 285 (19o6).
3'Cast v. State, 11 Ala. App. 177, 65 So. 718 (1914).
35Gen. Acts of Ala. 1915, p. 724. Bell v. State, z6 Ala. App. 36, 75 So. 18,
(1917); Bell v. State, 2oo Ala. 364, 76 So. I (1917).
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provides a less penalty for an offense than is provided by the statutes
of the state for the same offense.3" A similar law has been enacted in
Arkansas.17 It has been held by the Supreme Court of that state
that under this provision a man could not be prosecuted under a
municipal ordinance for running a "blind tiger" and under state law
for selling liquor without a license, where the same act constituted
both offenses.38
Indiana cities have been prohibited from making acts punishable
by ordinance which are already made public offenses and punish-
able by the state.39
In some jurisdictions the placing of a person in double jeopardy by
prosecution under both state law and municipal ordinance has been
avoided by holding that a municipality may not prohibit that which
is already made penal by statute unless express and specific authority
has been granted.4 In a case before the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in i886 the legality of an ordinance of the city of Raleigh
which made an assault upon a public officer of the city punishable
by fine or imprisonment was under consideration. The court pointed
out that to assault an officer was indictable under the general law
of the state and held that an ordinance "that undertakes to make
that which constitutes a criminal offence under the general law of the
State, an offence against the town, punishable by fine or otherwise, is
inoperative and void."'41
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has held that the
police power of municipal corporations in that state depends upon
the will of the legislature, and a city, town, or village can only exercise
such power as is fairly included in the grant of powers. It was held
that power conferred by the state law "to protect the persons and
property of the citizens of such city, town or village, and to preserve
peace and good order therein" did not confer power to punish acts
made criminal by the state law, except such as would be attended
with circumstances of aggravation not included in the state law.
Thus it was held that the carrying of deadly weapons, being an
offense fully provided for and punished by law, and being an act not
in itself amounting to a breach of the peace, could not be made an
offense and punished by municipal ordinance.42
6Davis v. State, 37 Texas Cr. 359, 39 S. W. 937 (1897).
37Richardson v. State, 56 Ark. 367, 19 S. W. 1052 (1892).
38Champion v. State, iio Ark. 44, 16o S. W. 878 (1913).
39City of Frankfort v. Aughie, ii4 Ind. 77, i5 N. E. 802 (1888).40Thrower v. City of Atlanta, 124 Ga. 1, 52 S. E. 76 (i9o5); Ex parte Fagg, 38
Tex. Cr. 573, 44 S. W. 294 (1898); Ex parte Bourgeois, 6o Miss. 663 (1882).41State v. Keith, 94 N. C. 933, 934 (r886).
42Judy v. Lashley, 5o W. Va. 628, 41 S. E. 197 (1902).
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It has been held in California that a municipal ordinance is void,
insofar as it makes precisely the same acts criminal as are declared
such by the state law. The court pointed out that the state consti-
tution limits the power of municipal corporations to the passage of
ordinances not in conflict with the general laws of the state.4
The correctness of the holding in most states that prosecution by
both municipality and state for the same act does not constitute
double jeopardy seems open to question.4 That there is actually
double prosecution by the state seems to be supported by a con-
sideration of the legal position of the city in the governmental system
of the state. And from the point of view of policy it seems "contrary
to principles of natural justice and humanity, and against the policy
of the law to multiply or carve different crimes out of only one
criminal act. ' '4
3In re Sic, 73 Cal. r42, 14 Pac. 4o5 (1887). Also see: Menken v. City of At-
lanta, 78 Ga. 668, 2 S. E. 559 (1887).
"See i COOLEY, CoNsTiTuTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 414.
OChampion v. State, supra note 38, at 46, I6o S. W. at 878.
